Mini bios of the speakers

Adriane Sanctis (LAUT, USP): Adjunct Professor of Comparative and International Law at the Institute of International Relations at the University of São Paulo (USP). Researcher at the Center for the Analysis of Freedom and Authoritarianism (LAUT), where she investigates the legal discourse of conservative movements.

Ana Alfinito Vieira (FGV São Paulo Law School): Coordinator of the Criminal Justice Observatory and Legal Adviser on the Amazon Watch. Ph.D. in Political Sociology, Max Planck Institute.

Bruce Wilson (University of Central Florida): Full Professor at the University of Central Florida and Associated Research Professor at the Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway. His primary research area focuses on comparative judicial politics in Latin America and his secondary interest engages with the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning.

Camila Gianella (CISEPA Pontifical Catholic University of Peru Executive Director): Professor at the Faculty of Psychology at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru.

Catalina Smulovitz (Torcuato Di Tella University): Catalina Smulovitz is Plenary Professor of Political Science at Torcuato Di Tella University.  She writes on human rights and civil-military relations, the uses of and access to legal systems, and on citizenship and social accountability in Latin America. Currently, she is researching the impact of Federalism on the protection of rights and judicial wars in Latin America. Her recent publications are: “From the Discovery of Law to Lawfare or How the Grapes Became Sour” SAAP Journal,  2022; “Access to Justice and Public Defense in Federal Contexts: Who has access and why in the Argentine provinces?” SAAP Journal, 2019.

Catalina Vallejo (University of Bergen): Postdoctoral Fellow at the Faculty of Law at the University of Bergen. Her research focus is on climate change litigation. 

César Rodríguez-Garavito (New York University): Professor of Clinical Law and Faculty Director. César is the Chair of the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice at NYU School of Law.

Cláudio Couto (FGV EAESP): Adjunct professor at the Department of Public Management at FGV EAESP and coordinator of the Professional Master’s Degree in Public Policy and Management (MPGPP). Cláudio is a researcher at the Public Sector Policy and Economy Center (CEPESP) and CNPq Productivity Fellow (level 1C), a YouTuber and podcaster (#ForadaPolíticaNãoháSalvação).

Conrado Hübner Mendes (University of São Paulo): Professor-Doctor of Constitutional Law at the Faculty of Law at the University of São Paulo. Member of the Science, Research and Freedom Observatory of the Brazilian Society for the Progress of Science (SBPC) and a researcher at the Center for the Analysis of Freedom and Authoritarianism (LAUT). He is also a columnist for the newspaper “Folha de S.Paulo”.

Dandara Rudsan (Iniciativa Negra): Researcher at Iniciativa Negra por uma Nova Política Sobre Drogas. Post-graduate student in Labor Law and Human Rights (UFPA). Former National Rapporteur on Human Rights of the DHESCA Platform on the ‘Racism, Public Security and Violence’ agenda. Political Articulator of National Network of Anti-Prohibitionist Feminists (RENFA) on the National Agenda for Extrication and Networking of Amazonian Black Women. 

Danielle Rached (FGV Rio de Janeiro Law School): Professor at Fundação Getulio Vargas Law School in Rio de Janeiro, where she teaches human rights and transnational law. She has written about the legitimacy of international institutions. Currently, she researches the consequences of far-right populist governments for the climate change agenda.

Dennis Pacheco (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública).

Eloy Terena (APIB): Legal Advisor to the Articulation of the Indigenous People (APIB) and the Coordination of Indigenous Organizations of the Brazilian Amazon (COIAB). Ph.D. in Social Anthropology (National Museum, UFRJ) and Ph.D. in Law (Faculty of Law, UFF). Post-Ph.D from École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris.

Felipe Freitas (UEFS/BA): Professor at the Brazilian Institute of Teaching, Development and Research (IDP), Researcher at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV) and Collaborating Professor at Federal University of Bahia (UFBA). Ph.D in law from the University of Brasília (UNB). Consultant and Program Advisor in the Freedom Project and Research Coordinator in the Observatory of Human Rights, Crisis and Covid-19. (tbc)

Florian Hoffmann (PUC-Rio): Professor at Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio).

Francisca Pou Giménez (UNAM): Researcher at the Institute for Legal Research of the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Francisca’s work is in the area of constitutional law and comparative constitutional law, with a research focus on courts, rights protection, and dynamics of constitutional change in Latin America. She is coeditor of Proportionality and Transformation: Theory and Practice from Latin America (CUP, 2022), with Laura Clérico and Esteban Restrepo.

Gabriel Sampaio (Conectas): Coordinator of Strategic Litigation and the Program to Combat Institutional Violence at Conectas Human Rights. Master in Social Relations Law from PUC/SP. Member of the Board of Directors of the Center for the Analysis of Freedom and Authoritarianism (LAUT). Consultant member of the Special Committee on Criminal and Penitentiary Policy of the OAB/SP. Advisor to the Advisory Board of the Police Ombudsman of the State of São Paulo.

Henrique Almeida (University of São Paulo): Ph.D. in Law and Political Economy (University of São Paulo). Incoming post-doctoral fellow at Getúlio Vargas Foundation for 2023, affiliated with the Core of Law and Political Economy (NUDEP). He is primarily interested in how the State’s organizational structure and the agency of non-official actors shape one another. His past research projects have applied socio-legal and comparative political approaches to the study of public-private relations in economic policy, institutionalized participation in healthcare policymaking and civil society under autocratization processes.

José Mauricio Arruti (Unicamp): Professor Dr. do Dep. de Antropologia da UNICAMP e pesquisador do CEBRAP, vinculado ao Núcleo Afro. Desenvolve pesquisas com comunidades quilombolas e povos indígenas, em especial sobre Etnicidade, Território, Memória e Educação. Atualmente coordena o projeto de pesquisa e extensão sobre acesso quilombola à justiça e o papel das defensorias públicas. Participa dos conselhos consultivos do Arquivo Edgar Leuenroth (AEL) e do Centro de Antropologia de Processos Educativos da Faculdade de Educação (CeAP); é pesquisador do Centro de Pesquisa em Etnologia Indígena (CPEI) e do Centro de Estudos Rurais (CERES), onde coordena o Laboratório de Pesquisa e Extensão com Populações Tradicionais Ameríndias e Afro-americanas (LaPPA).

Julia Goldani (FGV São Paulo Law School): Ph.D. candidate in Law and Development at FGV São Paulo Law School. Researcher at FGV’s Center for Racial Justice and Law, where she works on projects related to accountability for lethal police violence against Brazil’s black population. Current research interests also include public security policies, police reform and legal autocratization in contextes of historic state violence.

Juliana Vieira dos Santos (Coordenadora Jurídica da Rede Liberdade): Professor at the Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRRJ).

Karina Ansolabehere (National Autonomous University of Mexico): Researcher at the Institute of Legal Research of the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Her research areas are mass human rights violations and justice process in post-transitional settings as well as judicial change and innovation in Latin America. Co-Editor with Rachel Sieder and Tatiana Alfonso of the Handbook on Law and Society in Latin America, Routledge, and with Barbara Frey and Leigh Payne of the volume Disappearances in the Post-transition Era in Latin America (OUP).

Lara Côrtes (LawTransform/University of Bergen): Coordinator for LawTransform and Post-Doctoral Researcher at the Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI) for the Pluriland project.

Livia Buzolin (FGV São Paulo Law School). Lívia Gonçalves Buzolin (FGV São Paulo Law School). Ph.D candidate in Law and Development at FGV São Paulo Law School. Law Professor at Franca Law School. Researcher for the Project on Autocratic Legalism, linked to the Centre on Law and Political Economy at FGV Direito SP. Founder of the South-South Network, formed by CMI-UiB Centre on Law & Social Transformation affiliates. Lívia’s work is in the field of socio-legal studies, and her research interests include sexuality, gender, race, human rights, legislative processes, and courts.

Luciana Gross Cunha (FGV São Paulo Law School): Professor at Getúlio Vargas Foundation. Member of the Centre for Justice and Constitution at FGV São Paulo Law School.

Mariana Mota Prado (University of Toronto): Professor of International Law and Development in the Faculty of Law at the University of Toronto.

Mario Schapiro (FGV São Paulo Law School): Professor at Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV). Researcher at the Laboratory of Data and Empirical research in Law (LabDados) and the Core of Law and Political Economy (NUDEP).

Marjorie Marona (UFMG): Professor at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG), Political Science. Researcher at the Institute of Democracy and Democratisation of Communication (INCT/IDDC). Co-organizer of Democracia e Justiça na América Latina: para onde vamos? (EdUerj, 2022) and coauthor of A Lava-Jato e a erosão da Democracia no Brasil (Autêntica, 2021). Her research area focuses on comparative judicial politics in Latin America.

Marta Machado (FGV São Paulo Law School): Professor and coordinator of the school’s Academic Master’s and Doctorate Program. Senior researcher at CEBRAP; Fellow at the International Reproductive and Sexual Health Law Program, University of Toronto School; Associate researcher at the Oxford Human Rights Hub; Main Investigator at Maria Sibylla Merian Centre Conviviality-Inequality in Latin America (MECILA).

Matthew Taylor (American University): Matthew Taylor is Professor of International Studies and acting Associate Dean of Research at the School of International Service at American University. Taylor is the author or editor of five books and a variety of articles on Latin America. His most recent books are Decadent Developmentalism: The Political Economy of Democratic Brazil (Cambridge University Press, 2020) and Brazilian Politics on Trial: Corruption and Reform Under Democracy (Lynne Rienner, 2022), co-authored with Luciano Da Ros.

Mauricio Palma (FGV São Paulo Law School): Post-Doctoral Fellow at the FGV São Paulo Law School. Author of the book “Technocracy and Selectivity: NGOs, the UN Security Council and Human Rights” (2019), Nomos.

Mauricio Terena (APIB): Legal Advisor at the Articulation of the Indigenous People in Brazil (APIB), and consulting member of the Special Commission of the Indigenous’ Peoples’ Rights of the OAB/DF. Integrant of the Indigenous Terena People of the state of Mato Grosso do Sul.

Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin (FGV São Paulo Law School).

Nathalia Sandoval (FGV RI). Nathalia Sandoval is an Assistant Professor at the School of International Relations of the Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV-RI). She holds a Ph.D. in Government from the University of Texas at Austin. She earned her M.A in Political Science at the Universidad de los Andes in Colombia. She studied Law and specialised in Constitutional Law at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia. She specialises in law and politics, and comparative politics. Specifically, her research focuses on Latin American courts and human rights, and the relationship between those national institutions and local communities.

Oscar Vilhena (FGV São Paulo Law School): Dean and Professor at FGV São Paulo Law School. Founder of Conectas Human Rights, Pro Bono Institute, and Law Schools Global League (LSGL). He coordinates the multidisciplinary team at FGV, which prepares the assessment of social and environmental damage resulting from the collapse of the Fundão dam, in Mariana, for the Federal Prosecution Office.

Paola Bergallo (Torcuato Di Tella University): Associate Professor at the School of Law and Adjunct Researcher at the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET). Member of the Latin American Seminar on Constitutional Theory (SELA). 

Rachel Sieder (CIESAS): Senior Research Professor at the Center for Research and Graduate Studies in Social Anthropology (CIESAS) in Mexico City. Associate senior researcher at the Chr. Michelsen Institute and PI for the PluriLand project. Associate fellow at the Centre for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London. Research interests include: human rights, indigenous rights, social movements, indigenous law, legal anthropology, gender and law. Coeditor with Karina Ansolabehere and Tatiana Alfonso of The Handbook of Law and Society in Latin America, Routledge (2019).

Raquel Pimenta (FGV São Paulo Law School): Professor at Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV). Co-coordinator of the Core of Law and Political Economy (NUDEP).

Rebecca Abers (UnB): Professor of Political Science at the University of Brasília (UNB). Co-editor of the Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política. Co-coordinator of the RESOCIE Research group on Society State Relations. Member of the Advising Committee of the National Council of Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq).

Salvador Schavelzon (UNIFESP): Anthropologist (Museu Nacional-UFRJ), Professor and researcher at the Federal University of São Paulo (UNIFESP-OSASCO), Professor at the Postgraduate Program in Latin American Integration (PROLAM-USP). With works on Latin American constitutionalism, today researches indigenous cosmopolitics, Latin American politics and anthropological theory. He also writes at desinformemonos.org (México).

Sandra Botero (Del Rosario University):(Del Rosario University): Associate Professor, Faculty of International, Political and Urban Studies at the Universidad del Rosario.

Sheila de Carvalho (Coalizão Negra por Direitos): international human rights lawyer. Director of Political Advocacy at the Peregum Black Reference Institute. Founder and partner of Carvalho Siqueira Advogadas e Advogados. Coordinator of the Institutional Violence Nucleus of the OAB / SP Human Rights Commission and the Legal Reference Center of Artigo 19. Fellow of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Siri Gloppen (LawTransform/University of Bergen): Professor of Political Science at the Department of Government at the University of Bergen, Deputy Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Bergen, and founding Director of Centre on Law & Social Transformation (Lawtransform). Current projects include ´Sexual & Reproductive Rights Lawfare: Global Battles´, ‘Political determinants of sexual and reproductive health: Criminalisation, health impacts and game changers’ and Pluriland.

Sofia Rolim (FGV São Paulo Law School): Master in Law and Development at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV). Researcher for the Project on Autocratic Legalism, linked to the Centre on Law and Political Economy at FGV Direito SP. Public Servant in the Audit Court of the State of São Paulo.

Taís Penteado (FGV São Paulo Law School): Ph.D. Candidate in Law and Development at FGV São Paulo Law School and LL.M. candidate at Yale Law School. Collaborating Researcher at the Gender and Law Center at FGV São Paulo Law School and Tandem Fellow (Alexander von Humboldt Foundation) at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Crime, Security and Law (Freiburg, Germany).

Tatiana Alfonso (ITAM): Professor at the Division of Social Sciences and Law at the Department of Law at the Autonomous Institute of Technology of Mexico (ITAM).

Carlos Andrés Baquero-Díaz (NYU): Carlos Andrés is a JSD student at NYU Law School. His research interests include environmental law, human rights, multiculturalism, and governance. On his dissertation project, he explores the relationship between property rights and environmental protection in tropical forests.

The perfect enemy: From migrants to sexual minorities

Siri Gloppen, Lise Rakner (2019)

Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Brief no. 2019:05) 4 p.

Why did Poland´s conservative government, the Law and Justice Party, launch an attack on the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans people (LGBT) as part of their 2019 European Parliamentary elections campaign? The ruling nationalist party aimed to stem a decline in its popularity ahead of the elections by arguing that the opposition’s support for sex-education that recognizes LGBT people, is a threat to Polish culture and should be stopped. Poland’s governing party is far from alone in seizing on sexual minorities for mobilization purposes.

The timing of PiS´ targeting of the LGBT community is not surprising. PiS is facing a decline in popularity amid corruption allegations and questions about party chief Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s business dealings. Zeroing in on minority groups is a well-known strategy when support is in decline in an election year. The tactic worked well for the PiS is in 2015 when anti-migrant rhetoric drummed up the party´s support before its election defeat of the governing centre-left Civic Platform. This time, LGBT persons serve as the perfect enemy. This also reinforces ties with the church and with right-wing nativists, who see homosexuality as a threat to the natural order of society and traditional, patriarchal family values.  

In November 2018, Dar es Salaam´s governor, Paul Makonda, called for Tanzanians to report gay people as he announced a taskforce aiming to identify homosexuals, to be punished with lengthy prison sentences (unlike in Poland, homosexuality is illegal in Tanzania and punishable by up to 14 years in prison for men and 5 years for women). The governor’s targeting of Tanzania´s LGBT community must be understood as part of a broader attack on civil and political rights in Tanzania. And as in Poland, the governing party is in dire need of a focus shift. President John Pombe Magafuli was elected in 2015 on a promise to combat corruption. Since then, support for the President and his party have been ebbing. By attacking LBGT persons, the regime now aims for three things. First, by re-focusing national and international attention toward attacks on sexual minorities, domestic and international attention is shifted from corruption and escalating political violence. Second, the international condemnations following the attack on sexual minorities can be turned in the government’s favor by demonstrating for the Tanzanian population that the regime is not a puppet for international interests. Among the local populations, LGBT people have little support .Afrobarometer data from 2014/15 show that 81% of Tanzanians would dislike having homosexuals as neighbours although they are generally tolerant on other grounds. Thirdly, it portrays the government as addressing social problems, while shifting responsibility for social ills away. In deeply religious societies the Sodom-and-Gomorra argument has significant traction: Natural and social disasters like floods, corruption, illness and crime are God’s punishment for the society allowing immorality. By rooting out the “LGBT cancer”, and re-establishing the natural order of things, God will look favourably upon the country. A more secular version of the same argument is that homosexuality is fundamentally un-African, and that society is corrupted by straying from traditional African values.   

Politicalized homophobia: An export from Africa – or the United States?

Across the world, in Tanzania, Uganda, Poland, Hungary, the United States of America, Russia, Turkey, Indonesia, Venezuela and Brazil, rights of sexual and gender minorities have become salient electoral campaign issues. President Mugabe in Zimbabwe, Jonathan Goodluck in Nigeria and Museveni in Uganda have all employed homophobia as arsenals in their fight to maintain power. Across Africa, as in Poland, the attacks on the gay community is tied to a reaction toward international, western liberal values. An argument that is repeated time and again is that western interest, through their promotion of gay rights, is trying to recruit homosexuals among the youth population in collaboration with the county´s gay community. In Russia, for instance, new anti-gay laws were justified as an attempt to protect Russian children from gay «recruiters».

Africa may be considered a “front-runner” continent in terms of employing homophobia as an issue of political contestation and conflict. A growing literature, describing political attacks on the rights of LGBT persons across the African continent, links politicized homophobia to political or economic crises. Politicization refers to the process by which a social phenomenon becomes the basis of mobilization by societal and political actors, who turns it into an issue of major political significance, as a subject of heated public argument, mobilization, and conflict.

A common argument is that homosexuals are targeted as a group by incumbent politicians to divert attention away from pressing issues of corruption, economic decline or development challenges.  Tweet

The mobilization of latent homophobia is a strategy employed by political actors to divert attention when a regime´s fate is at stake – in elections, due to public opposition, or internal power struggles.

Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe, was the first African leader to use homophobia as a central political tool.  His attack on Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ) in his speech at the opening of the 1995 Zimbabwe International Book Fair (themed “Human Rights and Freedom of Expression”) became the start of international attention to politicized homophobia in Africa, much due to the mobilization of GALZ and their international partners. Shortly after, Mugabe delivered his infamous Hero’s Day speech: “Homosexuality degrades human dignity. It’s unnatural and there is no question of allowing these people to behave worse than dogs and pigs…if you see people parading themselves as lesbians and gays arrest them and hand them over to the police”. The political focus on homosexuality further intensified with the high-profiled arrest of Zimbabwe’s former President Canaan Banana on sodomy charges the following year, and later his trial and conviction in 1999.

Politicization of homosexuality

The trajectory of politicization of homosexuality in Zimbabwe illustrates some important patterns that we now see in many other countries. It shows how anti-gay sentiments are interwoven with the politics of democratic backsliding. Anti-gay sentiments are typically mobilized to divert attention from a looming economic- or governance crisis (which Zimbabwe experienced in the late 1990s) or to secure support in elections. Allegations and formal charges of homosexuality are also used against political opponents, or allies fallen out of favour. Yet, as illustrated by the Zimbabwe trajectory, politicization, while hurting and exposing gays, lesbians and trans-people to violence and ostracism, simultaneously gives strength to the LGBT movements. For GALZ the attention brought by Mugabe’s attacks boosted both their domestic membership as well as their international financial and political support. Finally, the Zimbabwe case illustrates the dual face of the courts. In convicting Canaan Banana for sodomy, the court arguably lent itself to political use – without necessarily being biased: While the charges and evidence in the case were credible, and the conviction in this sense valid, the prosecution is widely seen as politically motivated and strategically used to get rid of potential competition. At the same time GALZ secured important court victories. When the government tried to ban it from the 1996 Book Fair, GALZ brought the Ministry of Home Affairs to court and won the right to participate that year and at all future events.

In Uganda , the “Kill the Gays Bill”-saga received enormous international attention, from the moment David Bahati tabled the Anti-Homosexuality Act in Parliament in 2009, as a private member’s bill, proposing the death penalty for homosexuality. The bill also broadened the crime to public display of same-sex affection, and “aiding and abetting” through informing about LGBT rights or providing finance. It also proposed mandatory reporting of the crime of homosexuality, including by teachers, health personnel and family members. International attention remained focused on the Bill through its repeated resurfacing on the Parliamentary agenda, its adoption (in modified form) in December 2013, the signing into law by President Museveni in February 2014, and its nullification by the Constitutional Court on 1 August the same year. Similar to the Zimbabwean case, Uganda’s ruling party has put anti-gay sentiments to political use – both for populist ‘scapegoat’ mobilization, and against political opponents.  The Uganda case also parallels – and far supersedes – the Zimbabwean case in the way in which the LGBT movement has drawn strength from the politicization; both in terms of international support and their domestic position. Despite harsh rhetoric and harassment, the LGBT movement has been able to engage with the government under the radar.

Factors driving the politicization of homosexuality in Africa

A central feature of the politicization of LGBT debates in Africa is that they are framed, not only as a threat to public morality, but to African values, national integrity and sovereignty. Tweet

Homosexuals are used as scapegoats and to enhance powers of incumbent governments to channel criticism away from more serious matters, in a context where religion serves as refuge for a growing population who are increasingly disappointed with the promises of development. Some scholars focus on the ability of anti-gay mobilization to tap into a “cultural anger”,  marshalling intense emotions across diffuse domains and arenas of action, and thus uniting disparate individuals and groups in political pursuit of a common enemy or scapegoat. Others have questioned the link between disappointment with development and homophobia, pointing to the significant economic growth on the African continent in the period of cross-national rise in homophobic sentiments. The most vocal anti-gay voices  are urban-based religious actors, attracting educated professionals who are generally not the main “losers” of economic development. They emphasize the role of the Evangelical Pentecostal churches, mobilizing against homosexuality to strengthen collective identity and promote a “political project of Christian nation building”. The anti-gay agenda also serves to forge coalitions between political factions, and to unite them with important opinion leaders among in the churches, and among traditional leaders.  This also has a profound international dimension. Anti-gay activists and missionaries from the US – and religious international networks more generally – play important direct and support roles in these dramas, which has led some to argue that homophobia in Africa primarily should be seen an export of the US culture wars – or, acknowledging the strong local agency, as an African import of strategies and tactics from US allies.

Another aspect of the international dimension is that – within the discourses of nationalism, modernity and “cultural authenticity” – gay rights (and universal human rights), are frequently described as a “dangerous western import” that must be fought against. An example is the homosexuality debate in Uganda, where a key characteristic of the discourse was the portrayal of the West as decadent and depraved in contrast to the Ugandan morally pure national self. Resisting donor pressure to drop the Bill was framed as taking a stance for “traditional” Ugandan values and against the threat that homosexuality poses to the family as the fundamental societal unit. As a result, there is debate about whether international LGBT rights organizations well-intentioned work to mobilize local LGBT activism have been counterproductive. Middle-East specialist, Joseph Massad, argues that what we see is the reaction ot an international network of mostly Western organizations seeking to introduce a western conception of sexuality, and the homo/hetero dyad, in places where this has not been part of the discourse. This has politicized the issue in some cases leading to “crackdown” on and “persecution” of “the poor and nonurban men who practice same-sex contact and who do not identify as homosexual or gay” (Massad, 2002). Others also warn that donor promotion of LGBT rights lends itself to portrayal as a western imperial project, and several African LGBT activists urge the West not to provoke further backlash by for instance leveraging donor aid. Overt pressure from Western actors might provide anti-LGBT movements with ammunition for arguments of cultural imperialism.

Legal victories and political boomerangs

The picture of sexual minorities being used as the perfect enemy to win support needs nuances. While politicization is posing threats to sexual and gender minorities across the world, legal battles are being fought, and won, to safeguard LGBT rights. The South African Constitution provides strong protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity and same-sex marriage was legalized in 2006. Lesotho decriminalized homosexuality in 2014, Mozambique followed in 2015 and Angola in 2019. The African Human Rights Commission is also playing an active role in combating discrimination on the grounds of sexual identity. In the world’s largest democracy, India, section 377 of the constitution that criminalized homosexuality, a law based in the colonial ear sodomy laws, was removed by the Supreme Court in 2018, inspiring litigation elsewhere, including in Kenya, where the matter is currently before the Nairobi High Court.

Some scholars analysing US developments, see the legal victories for LGBT rights as drivers of the shifts that have taken place in public opinion towards greater acceptance of sexual and gender minorities. Others argue the contrary, that it is a reason for the rise in a conservative anti-gay mobilization. The argument is that if legal change, and in particular court decisions are too far removed from public opinion, this creates scope for counter mobilization to reverse the change . The so-called “backlash thesis” – developed among other by Gerald Rosenberg in The Hollow Hope (1991/2008)  holds that social rights won in court are likely to be ineffectual or counterproductive as they almost invariably will provoke a conservative counter mobilization and is likely to lead to polarized debates, stifling moderate voices.. 

Mirroring  the politics of homosexuality in Africa, «the Polish culture war» that is now being fought pitching Catholic, national, patriarchal family values against a liberal-democratic human rights perspective where sexual and gender minorities are protected, bear all hallmarks of a polarized debate and a political backlash against the legal impositions of the global liberal regime. However, the question remains whether «Stay away from the children» is the best slogan for a party that has tied its fortunes closely to the Catholic Church. As the mayor of Warsaw suggested, the warning should perhaps be directed toward the same church at a time when 382 priests are indicted for molesting children.

This Brief is based on: S. Gloppen and L. Rakner “LGBT Rights in Africa”, in Ashford C, & Maine A (eds) Research Handbook on Gender, Sexuality and the Law (London: Edward Elgar 2019, forthcoming).

We combine insights from three ongoing research projects funded by the Research Council of Norway: Sexual and reproductive rights lawfare – global battles; Political determinants of sexual and reproductive health in Africa; and Breaking BAD – backlash against democracy in Africa.

Lise Rakner

Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen

Senior Researcher (20%), Chr. Michelsen Institute

Siri Gloppen

Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen

Director, Centre for Law & Social Transformation

Breaking BAD: Understanding Backlash Against Democracy in Africa

Lise Rakner (2018)

Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Insight 2018:1)

There is a trend of democratic retrenchment across the African continent. Despite democratic gains in some states, the overall tendency over the past decade has been the erosion of democratic gains won in the period after 1990. Democracy is challenged in ways that pose threats to freedom of speech, association and information, the ability to choose political leaders, rule of law with recourse to independent courts, protection of personal integrity and private life. This CMI Insight discusses the ambiguous and multifaceted features of democratic backlash in Africa, and responses from international and domestic actors.

African states have adopted legal restrictions on key civil and political rights that form the basis of democratic rule in a range of countries from dominant party regimes, such as Ethiopia, Rwanda and Tanzania, to competitive electoral democracies, like Zambia, Senegal and Malawi. In South Africa, where democracy and rule of law appear deeply institutionalised, the succession battles and exposed levels of corruption under President Zuma, who was recently removed from the leadership of the ANC party, suggest a weakening of the institutions intended to check executive powers. The court annulment of the Kenyan elections of September 2017 suggests that the courts were able perform an important accountability function and safeguard free and fair election. However, the aftermath of the Kenyan elections culminated with President Uhuru Kenyatta closing TV and radio stations in early 2018.

This slow, piecemeal erosion of democracy from within means that it is exceedingly hard to pinpoint exactly when a political system transforms from one regime form to another. Tweet

Civil society actors, policy makers and scholars warn against the democratic backlash and its negative implications for domestic and international politics. Internationally, the African democratic backlash challenges global actors who have long pressured developing countries to politically liberalise. Yet, following what appears to be a global trend of democratic backsliding, space for international influence and the spread of liberal norms is closing rapidly. Domestically, the observed backlash against democracy may pose further social and political threats with wide-reaching implications for development. This may, in turn, challenge the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).  Rukanova and colleagues (2017) argue that whereas closing space for civil society impacts on voice and participation first and foremost, restrictions on civil society ultimately may curb even the most seemingly apolitical activities such as humanitarian relief.

The nature of democratic backlash: Democratic rights eroding from within

It is important to note that the current backlash against democracy differs from previous periods of democratic retrenchment. Contemporary processes of democratic backlash are slower in pace: now, democracies tend to erode and not break. In the 1970s, democratic breakdowns tended to result in abrupt military or one-party regime shifts (Bermeo 2016). This is no longer the case. Since the end of the cold war, almost 90 per cent of all countries in the world hold regular and at least minimally competitive elections. Yet, increasingly, we witness elections held under authoritarian conditions and incumbents manipulating the electoral process with no intention of succumbing their rule to electoral uncertainty and competition. Across the African continent, incumbent leaders resort to illiberal strategies to win elections, including election violence, vote-buying, voter intimidation, and media control. Yet, while observers lament that the quality of elections is eroding, multiparty elections are upheld, with regular intervals, across the continent.

A second distinctive feature characterising the contemporary democratic backlash is that it is primarily targeted at some institutions and some aspects of liberal democracy. Some democratic institutions are deliberately dismantled through legal and budgetary procedures, but other institutions may be thriving. Multiparty elections have become a regularised feature, yet democratically elected parliaments pass votes curtailing the independence of courts or electoral institutions intended to secure accountability in future electoral contests. Legal restrictions imposed on civil society groups in many countries are targeted only at some organisations, such as human rights organisations (Christensen and Weinstein 2013, Dupuy et al. 2016). Churches, trade union groups and other interest groups are typically not targeted by the new legal and financial restrictions. The incremental forms of backsliding also create political challenges as incremental changes such as alterations to electoral laws and voter registration procedures rarely mobilise mass protests. Similarly, media restrictions, court manipulation and restrictions on NGO funding may only generate fragmented opposition.

Finally, and closely linked to the points above, a central feature of the ongoing backlash against democracy is that the undoing of a set of democratic rights and the institutions upholding it are legitimised through democratic institutions that often marshal broad popular support. This slow, piecemeal erosion of democracy from within means that it is exceedingly hard to pinpoint exactly when a political system transforms from one regime form to another. This again challenges our understanding of the processes witnessed conceptually, methodologically and theoretically (Waldner and Lust 2018, Bermeo 2016). This again raises critical questions, like how do we know when a democracy is no longer a democracy? When do a regime change from one form to another?

Measuring democracy in Africa- what does the data say?

Is there evidence of a global democratic backlash? The answer, unfortunately, is yes. According to the Freedom House report, Freedom in the World 2018 Democracy in Crisis, 2017 marked the 12th consecutive year of a global decline of democracy. The global average level of democracy has slipped back to where it was before the year 2000. The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset which measures democracy along seven principles of democracy supports the overall trend reported by Freedom House,  However, they also report that on average, the decline has been moderate, and most changes have occurred within regime categories—with democracies becoming less liberal and autocracies less competitive and more repressive. So far, at least, the data reports relatively few countries backsliding from democracy all the way to full-blown autocracy. Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) is another index measuring the status of democracy. Their democracy index is constructed on five key measures of democracy: Elections and pluralism, citizen rights, governance, political participation and political culture, measuring democracy on a scale from 0 (autocracy) to 10 (full democracy).

According to the EIU democracy index, the African “mean score” has increased in this past decade from 4.11 to 4.28, yet below the global mean score at 5.52. The worrying trend is that the improvements happened in the period 2006-2011 and since progress has stagnated. Moreover, the data suggests significant regional differences. The most distinct democratic improvements have taken place in North and West Africa. Of the ten countries in Africa where democracy has markedly decline according to the five-point democracy index, four are East African countries: Ethiopia, Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi. In more than half the countries on the continent however, the process of democracy is characterised by stagnation. This is also the main conclusion in Bleck and van de Walle´s recent analysis of African elections (2018). According to these authors, a striking characteristic of the region that needs explaining is how little negative or positive regime change that has actually taken place since the conclusion of the democratic transitions of the mid-1990s. In the African context, when countries start holding regular multi-party elections, they largely continue to do so. Military coups that used to lead to lengthy periods of non-electoral politics, now get overturned quickly, because of both local and international pressures, and regular elections have become the default option of politics. This paradoxical continuity observed since the end of the transitions of the 1990s shows that the authoritarian reflexes in the executive have not changed markedly and the composition of the political class remains very similar:  Indeed, in a youthful continent, the political class seems to continue to be getting older (Bleck and van de Walle, 2018).

International responses to democratic backlash

Puzzlingly, the ongoing backlash against democracy appears heavily concentrated in countries that made distinctly democratic gains in the 1990s (van de Walle 2016).  African countries have traditionally been the recipient of high amounts of foreign aid, and as a result, benefited heavily from good governance support after the end of the Cold War at a time when the West had few competing interests. In the 1990s and 2000s, democracy assistance support resulted in a continent-wide growth of civil society organisations, the spread of basic human rights, and several successful national democratic transitions. Scholars and donors alike have spent a great deal of effort to study the institutionalisation of democratic rule on the African continent (Bratton & van de Walle 1997, Cheeseman 2015, Bleck and van de Walle 2018). Now, however, scholars, pundits and policymakers alike are struggling to explain the reverse: the ongoing backlash against democratic rule in Africa and how the international community can respond and counteract the ongoing erosion of democracy. But, responses from the international actors are challenged by the nature of the democratic backsliding. Incumbent governments employ formal democratic institutions and institutional mechanisms, set up with the support of the international community, in their attempt to roll back democracy, such as handsome majorities in the legislature won through electoral processes in part financed by international aid donors. The international community do not know how to respond to this trend (Bush 2015, Dietrich and Wright 2015), in part, because it is difficult to assess precisely when, how and which elements of democracy are eroding.

The international community does not know how to respond to democratic backsliding in part, because it is difficult to assess precisely when, how and which elements of democracy are eroding. Tweet

Arguably, international donors have performed relatively well in promoting and financing democratic institutions through engaging governments and power-holders. But governance assistance have been less successful in terms of identifying and assisting ‘change agents’ outside government (Banks, Hulme, & Edwards 2015, Breen 2015). African governments are increasingly imposing restrictions on foreign funding to NGOs and civil society associations, leaving international donors with fewer options as support to human rights and democracy traditionally has been channelled through NGOs either directly or through transnational NGOs. With this door gradually closing, the only other door open to international support is through governments, the international community is increasingly finding itself in a situation where their remaining “tools” to promote democracy appear to support the increasingly more autocratic tendencies of African executives.

Emphasising the global character of the ongoing “democratic backsliding”, arguably, political leaders no longer feel the need to “make excuses” or pretend to adhere to democratic institutions and liberal norms. Similar arguments may be made about the international community. Based on the positive economic results and progress on some key Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by some of Africa’s authoritarian, dominant party states like Ethiopia and Rwanda, parts of the aid community now appear to question the validity and legitimacy of adherence to democracy being a condition for developing assistance (Kelsall and Booth 2013). Observers now argue that competitive elections pose special dangers in low-income, poorly institutionalised political systems (Ibid). 

Responses to democratic backlash from civil society

African civil society associations are now facing a “double jeopardy.” They need increasing support from the international community to combat the retrenchment of democratic rights by their governments. Yet, due to governments imposing legal restrictions of NGOs receiving foreign funding, the same organisations are receiving less attention and financial support from the international community. As a result, both domestic civil society actors and international supporters are searching for new solutions. A number of recent studies and evaluations highlight the challenges posed by the “closing space for civil society engagement” (Brechenmacher 2017, Mendelson 2015, Rukanova et al. 2017). 

Rukanova and colleagues (2017) shed light on the ‘adaptation and mitigation’ approach that most international philanthropic foundations and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) are adapting, hoping to create a distance between the humanitarian actors and the more outspoken spectrum of development and human rights actors (Rukanova et al. 2017).  Harding (2015) points to a distinct shift in the “profiling” of NGO, either towards a stronger human rights (or protest) framing or a development framing, where civil society organisations increasingly shy away from focusing on governance issues in order to continue to operate without government interference. Increasingly, however, there is reason to expect that African civil society organisations aiming to advance human rights and good governance now have to operate “from below,” that is, through grassroots networks of activists who form local civil society groups, non-governmental organisations, or social movements focused on the protection of civil liberties. Because such work ultimately challenges the legitimacy of governments that carry out repression, human rights activists, including lawyers, journalists, and academics, are themselves often targeted for politically motivated trials or violent persecution by government agents (CIVICUS 2016).

Breaking Bad: Understanding Backlash Against Democracy in Africa

This research project, funded by the Norwegian Research Council (2018-2021), focuses on the conscious efforts of political actors and elites to curtail democratic rights along four interlinked dimensions of democracy. We further analyse variance along these four dimensions of rights and responses from domestic and international actors.

Participation rights enable access to decision-making and include rights to form, join, support, and operate political parties and civil society organisations, and to meet and to organise mass events. African states are increasingly legally preventing civil society organisations from engaging in human rights work.

Contestation rights enable citizens to freely express their opinion on policy and to choose their political leaders and to monitor elections. Freedom of information and the press is under pressure in Africa. Governments enact laws preventing access to information and allow them to close both traditional and online media. Sham elections are on the rise in African states, with reigning political elites manipulating elections to maintain their hold on power. Election monitors are increasingly being harassed and legally barred from carrying out their functions.

Rule of law rights entail access to courts and equal and impartial treatment of all people by the law, which can be realised only under conditions of judicial independence. Recent years have seen serious regressions in judicial independence across Africa.

Personal integrity and gender equality rights entitle citizens to bodily integrity and a private sphere free from state interference, and to equality of opportunity: the ability to access all social, political, and economic spheres without discrimination – irrespective of sexual orientation and gender identity. Rights concerning gender equality, sexuality and reproduction have been severely limited in recent years with new restrictions on homosexuality, marriage, and abortion.

Where do we go from here?

Across the African continent, democracy is under pressure in ways that pose political and social threats. Citizens face mounting legal restrictions on freedoms of speech and association and are often subjected to the repression of peaceful protest.  Governments perceive foreign aid to NGOs as supporting political opponents and a threat to their hold on power. Today, even the most basic of democratic achievements are being reversed, including in Africa’s more robust democracies like Zambia and South Africa (Gyimah-Boadi 2015). Institutions that were once crucial for promoting participation and fair contestation – such as courts, anti-corruption agencies and the media – are now under pressure and increasingly seen as being used as a part of an authoritarian toolkit. As a result, attention has turned away from explaining democratic transition and describing democratic consolidation towards specifying a democracy’s quality, identifying democracies’ hazard rates (the probability that they will decay), and explaining authoritarian persistence. Arguably, at the core of many democratic setbacks over the past decades, is the failure of institutionalisation – put differently, the capacity of many new democracies in the developing world has not kept pace with popular demands for democratic accountability. This piecemeal erosion of the democratic fabric of many African governments requires us to see democracy as a collection of multiple institutions and actors. Understanding the current backlash’s timing, manifestations, causes, and effects is not only of great scholarly importance, it also has significant policy relevance in a context where the international aid community is scaling back their support and the consequent potential for permanent, worldwide political regression.

While there are a number of recent studies and evaluations that highlight the challenges posed by the backlash of democracy in Africa, at present, we have a limited understanding of possible response mechanisms. How do activists come together to advocate for particular rights? When are activists more effective in generating mass citizen support for their campaigns? How can researchers, international actors and domestic civil society organisations work together to disseminate and use knowledge about organisational resilience in these circumstances?  These will be pressing questions for scholars and activists going forward.

References

Banks, N. E. Hulme, D. Edward, 2015. “NGOs, States and Donors Revisited. Still too Close for Comfort?” World Development, Vol66, pp. 707-718.

Bermeo, Nancy. 2016. “On Democratic Backsliding”. Journal of Democracy, 27(1): 5-19.

Bleck, Jamie and Nicolas van de Walle, 2018 (forthcoming): Electoral Politics in Africa since 1990. Continuity and Change. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas van de Walle. 1997. Democratic Experiences in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brechenmacher, S., 2017. Civil Society Under Assault: Repression and Responses in Russia, Egypt and Ethiopia. NY: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Bush, Sarah, 2015: The Taming of Democracy Assistance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Carothers, Thomas. 2015. “The Closing Space Challenge: How Are Funders Responding?” Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Cheeseman, N., 2015: Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures and the Struggle for Political Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Christensen, D., and J. M. Weinstein. 2013. “Defunding Dissent: Restrictions on Aid to NGOs”. Journal of Democracy, 24(2): 77-91.

Civicus. 2015. “State of Civil Society Report”. Johannesburg: Civicus.

Dietrich, Simone, and Joseph Wright. 2015. Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics and Democratic Change in Africa. Journal of Politics, 77(1), 216-234.

Dupuy, Kendra, James Ron, and Aseem Prakash. 2016. “Hands Off My Regime! Governments’ Restrictions on Foreign Aid to Non-Governmental Organizations”. World Development, 84: 299-311.

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Harding, L. 2015: Protecting Human Rights and Development Actors. York: University of York Centre for Applied Human Rights. Working Paper No. 1.

Helle, Svein Erik and L. Rakner (2017), “The impact of elections. The case of Uganda”, in Johannes Gerschewski and Christoph Stefes (eds.). Crisis in Autocratic Regimes, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 111-134.

Kelsall, T. and D. Booth, 2013: Business, Politics, and the State in Africa: Challenging the Orthodoxies of Growth and Transformation. London. Zed Books.

Levitsky, S. and L. Way, 2015: “The myth of democratic recession”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 45-58.

Mendelson, S.E., 2015. Why Governments Target Civil Society and What Can be Done in Response: A New Agenda. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Rukanova, S., R. Herweijer, R. Kerkhoven, H. Surmatz, D. Doane, 2017. Why Shrinking Civil Society Space Matters in International Development and Humanitarian Action. European Foundation Centre and Funders Initiative for Civil Society.

Van de Walle, N., 2016: “Two cheers for African democracy”, in Muna Ndulo and Mamoudou Gazibo, (eds). Growing Democracy: Elections, Accountability, and Democratic Governance in Africa, (Cambridge UK: Cambridge Scholars, 2016).  pp. 304-312.

Waldner D. and El Lust (2018). Unwelcome Change. Coming to Terms with Democratic Backsliding. Annual Review of Political Science. Forthcoming.

Wood, Ngaire. 2008. “Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, Emerging Donors and the Silent Revolution in Development Assistance”. International Affairs, 84(6): 1205-1221.

Photo by:

Commonwealth Secretariat

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Lise Rakner

Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen

Senior Researcher (20%), Chr. Michelsen Institute