Time: 14:30 – 15:30
Both in Latin America and Eastern Europe ambitious constitutional justice systems were established as part of the transitions from authoritarian rule in these regions in the 1980s and 1990s. Many of these constitutional courts assumed roles exceeding their historical functions – and those of constitutional courts in advanced industrial democracies. A new book by Daniel M. Brinks and Abby Blass – The DNA Of Constitutional Justice in Latin America: Politics, Governance and Judicial Design – argues that the politics of the constitutional moment are reflected in the DNA of constitutional justice. Mechanisms of control are designed to ensure the framers and their successors a continued role in governing around important, threatened political goals. Still, in many parts of the world, and not least in in Eastern Europe, the new constitutional justice systems are currently under siege. Why is this so? And what are the ways in which they are pressured and their independence and effectiveness undermined
Introduction by Daniel M. Brinks (University of Texas, Austin)
Participants include: Pavel Chikov (Agora, Russia), Sudir Krishaswamy (CLPR Bangalore),
Luciana Gross Cunha (FGV Law School, São Paulo) Eirik Holmøyvik (University of Bergen, member of Venice Commission)